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Geoffrey W.G. Leane*

Indigenous Rights Wronged:
Extinguishing Native Title in
New Zealand

This article is an account of a recent controversy in New Zealand regarding the
common law native title rights of indigenous Maori people to a possible title in
certain areas of the foreshore and seabed. In overturning its own precedent the
New Zealand Court of Appeal had opened the door to such claims. However,
the legislature, overwhelmingly supported by the majority non-Maori population,
moved quickly to extinguish the inchoate rights with no guarantee of fair
compensation. The lack of any constitutional protection of civil and political rights,
and the absence of alternative institutional checks and balances, allowed the
legislation to proceed unimpeded notwithstanding vigorous protests from Maori
and from the Waitangi Tribunal whose mandate relates to the treaty rights of New
Zealand's indigenous Maori minority. The fragility of civil and political rights in New
Zealand has been articulated elsewhere, and the narrative outlined here presents
a near-perfect instance of an inadequate rights regime facilitating an iniquitous
outcome for a disempowered minority. It is a fairly straightforward tale of rights
abuse and an exemplary study of the importance of constitutional protection
of certain rights, in this case discrimination on grounds of race, against hostile
majorities even in a modern liberal democracy. Both the native title jurisprudence
and rights issues are imbued with the Canadian experience but lie in (sometimes
dramatic) counterpoint to it.
Cet article est un compte rendu d'une r6cente controverse en Nouvelle-Z6lande
relativement aux droits autochtones, en common law, du peuple Maori sur
certaines zones littorales et sur le fond marin. En infirmant son propre precedent,
la Cour d'appel de la Nouvelle-Z6lande a ouvert la porte aux revendications
de ce type. Cependant, la 16gislature, avec I'appui de I'immense majorit6 de
la population qui n'appartient pas au peuple Maori, a rapidement reagi pour
6teindre ces droits virtuels, sans aucune garantie d'indemnisation equitable.
L'absence de protection constitutionnelle des droits civils et politiques, et
I'absence de quelque m~canisme de contrle institutionnel ont permis 6 la loi
d'6tre adoptee sans entraves, malgr6 les protestations vigoureuses des Maoris et
du tribunal Waitangi dont le mandat vise les droits issus de trait~s de la minorit6
maori autochtone de Nouvelle-Z61ande. La fragilit6 des droits civils et politiques
en Nouvelle-Z6lande a 6t6 expliqu6e ailleurs et les faits relates ici sont un
exemple quasi parfait d'un regime de droits inad~quat qui autorise un r6sultat
inique pour une minoritd d6munie. Cest un r6cit qui r6sume clairement I'abus de
droits et une 6tude exemplaire de I'importance de la protection constitutionnelle
qu'il faut accorder J certains droits, dans ce cas la discrimination fond6e sur
la race, contre des majorit6s hostiles, m~me dans une d6mocratie moderne et
lib~rale. La jurisprudence sur les droits autochtones et les questions de droits
sont empreintes de I'exp~rience canadienne mais se pr6sentent en contrepoint
-parfois dramatique-i cette experience.
* G.W.G. Leane, B.Econ. (Hons) (Adel.); LL.B., LL.M. (U.B.C.); LL.M. (Harvard) is a Senior
Lecturer in the School of Law, University of Canterbury, New Zealand. The author would like to
thank Jeremy Finn and Sacha McMeeking for making some editorial revisions which he was not able
to undertake.
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Introduction
In June2003 the New Zealand Court ofAppeal handed down its controversial
NgatiApa' decision recognizing the possibility of unextinguished common
law rights for New Zealand's indigenous Maori people. More specifically
it held that the courts-in particular the Maori Land Court-had jurisdiction
to determine the status of the foreshore and seabed. In other words there
remained the possibility (subject to a finding on the facts) that Maori
retained a customary right to the foreshore and seabed which might in
some cases amount to the equivalent of a fee simple title where exclusive
use and occupation could be shown.'
The appellants were a group of iwi (indigenous Maori tribes) at the
top of New Zealand's South Island. They claimed as Maori customary
land all of the foreshore and seabed of an area known as the Marlborough
Sounds, extending to the limits of New Zealand's territorial sea. They had
first applied for such a declaratory order from the Maori Land Court in
1997 and were successful in gaining an interim decision that such rights
had not been extinguished. In 1998 the attorney-general appealed to the
Maori Appellate Court, which in turn referred the case to the High Court.
The appellants succeeded, whereupon the Maori claimants appealed to the
Court of Appeal. They were successful on the question of the possibility
of an unextinguished customary title. The Court of Appeal considered
1. Ngati Apa v. Attorney-General, [2003] 3 N.Z.L.R. 643 (C.A.) (also known as the "Marlborough
Sounds" case).
2.
For a more detailed discussion of the legal niceties involved with customary law and the "special
juridical area of foreshore and seabed" see F.M.(Jock) Brookfield "Maori Claims and the 'Special'
Juridical Nature of Foreshore and Seabed" (2005) 2 N.Z.L. Rev. 179 and Richard Boast, Foreshore
andSeabed(Wellington: LexisNexis, 2005) [Boast 2005]. For an extended discussion of the legal, and
particularly jurisdictional, issues arising from Ngati Apa see R. Boast, "Maori Proprietary Claims to
the Foreshore and Seabed after Ngati Apa" (2004) 21 N.Z.U.L.Rev. I [Boast 2004].
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prior legislative vesting of the seabed in the Crown but found that it was
not sufficient of itself to extinguish customary title,3 the implication being
that a "clear and plain intention" to do so was required.4 In a similar case
the High Court of Australia had recognized a qualified common law
aboriginal title over the territorial sea,5 though that case was not referred
to by the New Zealand court. The Crown has not appealed the Ngati Apa
decision. Although the possibilityof an unextinguished customary title was
recognized by the Court of Appeal in Ngati Apa the court was not required
to make any factual determination in this case; indeed it warned against
excessive optimism.6 The miminalist nature of the Court's determination
has been emphasised by commentators such as Paul McHugh.7
The decision was "no judicial novelty"8 but unusual in that the Court of
Appeal had to overturn its own precedent, for it had held in the Ninety-Mile
Beach9 case that once the Native Land Court had made a determination of
title to land then there was no further title seaward to be investigated-it
belonged to the Crown. Similarly, the Court of Appeal finding that prior
legislation in respect of the foreshore and seabed was not sufficiently
explicit to extinguish any native title is perhaps not surprising. Given
the historical difficulties of bringing native title claims in New Zealand
(see below), and given the ruling in Ninety-Mile Beach, the Crown would
understandably have assumed that there was no native title with which
it need be concerned and therefore no need to assert its untrammelled
sovereignty by explicitly extinguishing it. The abrupt undermining of that
logic in Ngati Apa might help explain the alacrity with which the Crown
hastened to undermine the decision.
In Ninety-Mile Beach the court had also held, perhaps obiter,that Maori
customary title existed only at the discretion of the Crown and so was not
legally binding on the Crown.10 In doing so it followed the nineteenth

3.
Ngati Apa, supra note I at para. 160 (per Keith and Anderson JJ.).
4.
F.M. Brookfield, "Maori customary title to foreshore and seabed" (2003) N.Z.L.J. 295 at 296.
5.
Commonwealth ofAustralia v. Yarmirr (2001), 208 C.L.R. I (H.C.). For a detailed comparative
analysis of indigenous peoples' claims to sea spaces see, for example, C.Rebecca Brown & James
Reynolds "Aboriginal Title to Sea Spaces: A Comparative Study" (2004) 37 U.B.C.L.Rev. 449.
6.
Ngati Apa, supra note I at para. 8-9 (per Elias C.J.).
7.
Paul McHugh "Setting the Statutory Compass: the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004" (2005) 3
N.Z.J. Pub. & Int'l L. 255 at 256.
8.
See Brookfield, supra note 4 at 297, compare McHugh "Aboriginal Title in New Zealand: A
Retrospect and Prospect" (2004) 2 N.Z.J. Pub. & Int'l L. 139 at 141. Boast 2005, supra note 2 at 80
sees the decision as more novel in the New Zealand context.
9.
In re the Ninety-Mile Beach, [1963] N.Z.L.R. 461 (C.A.). For an earlier academic critique of the
foreshore issue and its earlier determination in the case of In re the Ninety-Mile Beach see R. Boast,
"In re Ninety-Mile Beach Revisited: the Native Land Court and the Foreshore in New Zealand Legal
History" (1993) 23:4 V.U.W.L.R. 145.
10. Ibid. at 468 (per North J).
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century case of Wi Parata," which in turn was specifically disavowed by
the Court of Appeal in NgatiApa 2 and which was in any event at odds with
a long line of North American cases beginning with Chief Justice Marshall
of the U.S. Supreme Court in Johnson v M'Intosh 3 , re-surfacing in Canada
with the Calder4 case in 1973, and later in Australia with the Mabo 5 case.
Thus could Ngati Apa fairly be characterized as "no judicial novelty";
on the contrary, it merely aligned the New Zealand jurisprudence a little
more closely with comparable Commonwealth jurisdictions. Though
not the subject of this paper, one might incidentally draw out a similar
alignment between legislative responses in Australia and New Zealand
to these somewhat revisionist judicial findings on common law native
title.' 6 Australian legislation (the Native Title Acts) sought to acknowledge
customary title (albeit within certain constraints) but appears to have had
something of chilling effect.' 7 As we shall see, however, the legislative
response to Ngati Apa was of a different order and sought nothing less
than the extinguishment of that form of native title amounting to exclusive
use and occupation (should such a claim ever have succeeded). In both
jurisdictions there was no constitutional restraint on legislation seeking to
impinge on native title.
In any event jurisprudential arguments supporting the Ngati Apa
decision were immediately lost in the extraordinary political controversy
generated by the decision and the equally extraordinary legislative
response. In fact such arguments were virtually never made in the rush to
eliminate any perceived threat to majority non-Maori interests.

11. Wi Paratav. Bishop of Wellington (1877), 3 N.Z. Jur. (N.S.) 77.
12. Ngati Apa, supra note I at para. 13 (per Elias C.J.).
13. Johnson v. MIntosh, 8 Wheaton 543 (1823).
14. Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 313. Subsequent modem cases
recognizing and articulating the nature of common law aboriginal title in Canada include Guerin v. The
Queen [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335 ; R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075; Vanderpeet v. The Queen (1996),
137 D.L.R. (4th) 289; Delgamuukw v. The Queen (1997), 153 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (S.C.C.).
15. Mabo v. Queensland (No 2) (1992), 175 C.L.R. I (H.C.).
16. As to which see generally Paul McHugh, AboriginalSocieties and the Common Law -A History
of sovereignty,status andself-determination (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
17. See, for example, Maureen Tehan, "A Hope Disillusioned, An Opportunity Lost - Reflections
on Common Law Native Title and Ten Years of the Native Title Act" (2003) 27 Melbourne U.L.Rev.
523 at 556-563; Alex Reilly, "From a Jurisprudence of Regret to a Regrettable Jurisprudence: Shaping
Native Title from Mabo to Ward" (2002) 9 Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law online:
Murdoch University <http://murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v9n4/reilly94nf.html at para 30>. Note that
the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) ruled that amendments to
Australia's Native Title Act were discriminatory in their emphasis on extinguishment and uncertainty
(Decision (2)54 on Australia - Concluding observations/comments, 18 March 1999), both of which
characterize the New Zealand legislation.
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I. Legislative response
Within three days of the Ngati Apa decision being handed down the prime
minister foreshadowed the government's intention to undermine the court's
finding of a possible unextinguished native title. 8 Ironically she noted in
the same press release that "[i]n a democracy, citizens are free to explore
what their legal rights are through the court system."' 9 Such was not to
be. There was a swift and angry public response to the (misconceived)
perception of widespread Maori ownership of the foreshore and seabed;
indeed it was later admitted by the relevant minister that it was this anger that
drove the political response.2" There followed a flurry of government press
releases and reports 2' attempting to assuage public fears. In August 2003,
just two months after the Ngati Apa decision, the government released its
framework policy, based on "principles" of access for all New Zealanders,
regulation by the Crown, protection of "customary interests" and certainty
over the administration of the foreshore and seabed. The essence of the
government's response was that the foreshore and seabed "should be public
domain, with open access and use for all New Zealanders" 22 and therefore
even the possibility of Maori being able to demonstrate exclusive use and
occupation over any part of it could not be tolerated. The historical basis
2 3
for such an assumption was not stated but is perhaps open to question.

18. Rt. Hon. Helen Clark (Prime Minister) "Ministers comment on Court of Appeal decision"
(22 June 2003) online: New Zealand Government <http://www.beehive.govt.nz/ViewDocument.
=1
aspx?DocumentlD
7134>.
19. Ibid.
20. The public response was, not surprisingly, ill-informed on the historical and legal issues and
tended to focus on a misplaced fear that "ordinary," non-Maori citizens would be excluded from the
nation's beaches. See, for example, The Press (14 July 2003) A9:
Application of the Court of Appeal's decision could lead to the abomination of riparian
apartheid, with the greater populous confined to narrow fenced-off strips of dry public land
to watch a favoured few customary rights holders, invitees, and payees enjoying exclusive
benefit of privatised beaches, tidal waters, and the sea.
In the same vein (B. Mason, "It Will Be a Profound Shock to Most People to Learn That They Have
No Rights of Recreation Over Foreshores" Otago Daily Times (6 July 2003):
[the Ngati Apa decision] threatens to open a Pandora's box of electoral horrors: Maori
claims to exclusive ownership and thereby control or prohibition of every New Zealander's
assumed right to fish, sail, walk, bathe, or kick a football around on the beach, anywhere,
any time, for free.
The deputy prime minister, who was also charged with formulating a policy response to the NgatiApa
decision, admitted some time later that the Government had been motivated to enact the Foreshoreand
SeabedAct 2004 by "the depth of Pakeha [non-Maori] anger and alarm" ("Pakeha anger led to Govt.
action" NZPA, The Press (13 October 2005) A2.
21. Online: New Zealand Government <http://www.beehive.govt.nz/foreshore/home.cfm>.
22. Rt. Hon. Helen Clark (Prime Minister) "Access guaranteed for all New Zealanders" (7
April 2004) online: New Sealand Government <http://www.beehive.govt.nz(ViewDocument.
=
aspx?Documentl D 19392>.
23. Paul McHugh, supranote 8, suggests at 161 that it is far from clear that Anglo-settler communities
in Australasia are right in assuming a right of recreational use of beaches.
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At no time was any attempt made to define the alleged threat to "all
New Zealanders" in terms of the likelihood of any Maori claims succeeding
given the difficulty of the legal tests, far less the actual areas likely to
be claimed in exclusive use and occupation. Lost in the (misleadingly)
egalitarian rhetoric was the unpleasant reality that equal access to some (in
all likelihood very small) part of the coast was to be bought in a cynical
trade-off with indigenous rights. The effect of the legislation is obviously
the loss of indigenous people's rights recognized by the country's highest
court, but worse is the unpleasant odour of racial discrimination when
the group suffering the rights loss is defined by race, since by definition
only indigenous peoples could assert the right being extinguished. Such
a prospect would be remote in Canada in light of its entrenchment of
"aboriginal and treaty rights" in section 35 of the ConstitutionAct 1982,
or in other jurisdictions where protection from discrimination on grounds
of race is entrenched in a constitution, but not in New Zealand.
In considering the public outcry which followed the decision it should
be recalled that the Court of Appeal did not in fact find any Maori title
or valid claim of any kind in the foreshore or seabed. On the contrary it
warned of"a number of hurdles in fact and law."' 24 It merely acknowledged
the possible existence of such a title. Any successful claim would depend
on the facts and the ability of the claimants to meet successfully the difficult
tests for showing native title. Given the concerns of the New Zealand public
over access to beaches, it should also be noted that New Zealand law had
never established a universal right of access to the nation's waterways and
that perhaps thirty per cent of the land alongside those waterways is, at
least with respect to access, effectively privately owned."
Nonetheless public opinion polls reported that some sixty per cent
of New Zealanders supported the assertion of public ownership of the
foreshore and seabed, with less than one-third willing to support customary
ownership even where free public access was assured. 26 More alarmingly,
only three per cent wanted the government to do nothing and allow Maori
claims to go through the court process to which they had been invited by

24. Ngati Apa, supra note I at 8 (per Elias, C.J.).
25. Chapman Tripp, "Counsel: Public access and private property rights" (29 August 2003) online:
Chapman Tripp <http://chapmantripp.com/resourcelibrary/published article.asp?id=2581> at 5.
26. "Majority opposed to customary ownership" The New ZealandHerald(18 August 2003), quoting
a Herald-DigiPoll survey.
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the Court of Appeal.27 Public opinion, it is argued by some, was not only
misinformed on the issues but perhaps cynically so.28
The public were invited to make submissions on the Government's
draft policy29 and a round of meetings with Maori were held.30 NonMaori responses tended to vary between viewing the proposals as too
hard on Maori while others found them too gentle." Maori submissions
were unsurprisingly more critical: for example, one coalition of Maori
organizations characterized the proposals as "the greatest property
confiscation in New Zealand's history, and one without compensation"32
and as "a race-based response. '33 Maori leaders organized a march and
34
protest (or "hikoi") on Parliament, attracting some 20,000 protesters.
However, given the complexity of the underlying legal issues and the
political imperatives driving the process it was not surprising that these
consultations had little effect on policy. The subsequent Waitangi Tribunal
report dismissed the consultation process as inadequate and echoed a
3
common sentiment that the government had already made up its mind. 1
It may well be that from the perspective of high politics the government
made a tactical mistake in signalling its intention to overrule Ngati Apa so
quickly. Notwithstanding the public hysteria and hostility to any perception
of "special rights" for Maori, the government might well have bided its
time and left the matter to the courts. This more conventional option, along
with the alternative of protracted negotiations with Maori, was commonly
referred to as the "long conversation" and was seen by many as a more
appropriate response. Given the difficulty of meeting the common law
tests for demonstrating any customary right, far less exclusive use and
occupation, the whole issue may well have proved to be a storm in a

27. Ibid.
28. See, for example, F.M. (Jock) Brookfield "Popular Perceptions, politician lawyers and the sea
land controversy" (Sept 2005) N.Z.L.J. 315 at 318: 'The public were allowed, indeed encouraged, to
perceive, incorrectly, that the Court of Appeal had perpetrated some extraordinary judicial coup and
had created a problem only to be solved by the legitimate extinguishment of Maori customary title'.
29. Online: New Zealand Government <http://www.beehive.govt.nz/foreshore/foreshore-seabedreport-exec-summary.pdf > Appendix II
30. Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, The Foreshore and Seabed of New Zealand:
Report on the Analysis of Submissions (December 2003) Executive Summary, online: New Zealand
Government <http://www.beehive.govt.nz/foreshore/report/24.cfm> Appendix I.
31. Online: New Zealand Government <http://www.beehive.govt.nz/foreshore/foreshore-seabedreport-exec-summary.pdf>.
32. Treaty Tribes Coalition, One Rule of Law for all New Zealanders: A Submission by the Treaty
Tribes Coalition on the Foreshoreand Seabed Issue (February 2004) at 8.
33. Ibid. at 11.
34. "HiKoi updates" The New Zealand Herald (5 May 2004), online: The New Zealand Herald
<http://www.nzherald.co.nz/index.cfm?ObjectlD=3564583>.
35. Waitangi Tribunal, Report on the Crown s Foreshoreand Seabed Policy (2004) online: Waitangi
Tribunal <http://www.waitangi-tribunal.govt.nz/reports/generic/> (Introduction).

48

The Dalhousie Law Journal

teacup. Even had some claims amounting to exclusive use and occupation
eventually been proven they would in all likelihood have been relatively
minor and should controversy have erupted again the government could
have blamed "activist" judges and if necessary legislated at that time
in the context of a demonstrated and tangible "threat" to the non-Maori
majority.
In the event, however, the government proceeded with a poll-driven
legislative response, firstly with a draft bill for consultation and then with
the ForeshoreandSeabedAct 2004. The Act was entirely unaffected by the
consultation process. The original bill was the subject of Select Committee
hearings around the country, but notwithstanding the controversial
subject matter and some 3946 written submissions to the Committee it
36
recommended no changes to the proposed legislation.
The Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 vested "the full legal and
beneficial ownership of the public foreshore and seabed ...
in the Crown,
so that the public foreshore and seabed is held by the Crown as its absolute
property."3 7 For greater finality the same section asserts that "[t]he Crown
does not owe any fiduciary obligation, or any obligation of a similar
nature, to any person in respect of the seabed. ' 38 The "public foreshore and
seabed" is defined (section 5) as "not includ[ing] any land that is ...
subject
to a specified freehold interest."3 9 Thus only Maori property rights (as
recognized by the Court of Appeal, but possibly extending to fee simple
title) are extinguished, but not existing private titles. It is this aspect that
incites accusations of race-based discrimination.
The Act then attempts to address a kind of common law native
title, being the grounds upon which the Court of Appeal found for the
claimants, but in doing so reveals a legislative contempt for that source of
indigenous rights long recognized in, for example, Canada and the United
States and more recently Australia. For example, nowhere in the Act is
the term "native title" even used notwithstanding that it is that title which
is being legislatively constrained and, in its strongest form of "exclusive
use and occupation," actually destroyed.4 ° More extraordinary, indeed
unprecedented in any comparable jurisdiction, is the legislative allowance

36. Fisheries and Other Sea Related Legislation Select Committee, Report on the Foreshoreand
Seabed Bill (2003) online: Select Committee Reports <http://www.clerk.parliament.govt.nz/Content/
SelectCommitteeReports/Final%20F S%20Report.pdf>.
37. Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 (N.Z.) 2004/93, s.13(l).
38. Ibid. at s.13(4).
39. Ibid. at s.5.
40. The use of the term "extinguished," though appropriate in normal parlance and used by some
writers (eg Boast 2005 (supra note 2) at 133), may lead to confusion because "extinguishment" has
acquired a restricted technical meaning in native title cases, as to which see Paul McHugh "Aboriginal
Title in New Zealand: A retrospect and Prospect" (2004) 2 N.Z.J. Pub. & Int'l L. 139, 186 ff.
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for this latter form of title to be claimed by any "group"; that is to say, it
is no longer the exclusive domain of indigenous peoples-as is assumed by
the entire body of Anglo-American law on native title-but of any "group"
meeting the test, including settlers. 41 There seems to be a conscious attempt
to erode the integrity not only of the content and provenance of native title
itself but even of the singular group to which it might adhere.
From there the legislation proceeds to divide native title according to
possible forms of content.42 Firstly claims to "customary rights orders" by
Maori will be heard in the Maori Land Court; those by non-Maori are to
be heard in the High Court. In either case an application must be made
by 2015. 41 The test for such rights, based on specific use rights defined as
an "activity, use, or practice" is broadly similar to those articulated in the
Canadian jurisprudence, 44 and is onerous. Customs capable of recognition
must be integral to Maori culture, must have been practised substantially
uninterrupted since the assertion of British sovereignty in 1840, continue
to be practised and not have been prohibited or extinguished as a matter
of law. 45 Although the rights order may include a commercial component
the exercise of customary activity, commercial or otherwise, is "subject to
the scale, extent, and frequency specified ... in the order, ' 46 suggesting the
47
possibility of a "frozen rights" approach long rejected in Canada.
But the more contentious category is that of "territorial customary
rights," a new nomenclature for rights amounting to exclusive use and
occupation which might ground a claim equivalent to fee simple title. 48 It
was the spectre of these rights that raised for (non-Maori) New Zealanders
the bogeyman of Maori excluding non-Maori from the nation's beaches,
though recall that far from making any actual finding on the existence of
41. Foreshore and SeabedAct 2004 (N.Z.). This peculiar provision was the result of a political tradeoff by which the government, unable to stitch together a sufficient parliamentary majority, obtained
the support of a minority party (New Zealand First) at the cost of accommodating its leader (now a
Cabinet Minister though his party is not in any formal coalition), who has been quoted as saying that
an "annual yachting regatta might qualify" (as a non-Maori customary activity)! (Boast 2004, supra
note 2 at 23-25).
42. For detailed commentaries on the legislation see Boast 2005, supra note 2 and Paul McHugh
"Setting the Statutory Compass: the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004" (2005) 3 N.Z.J. Pub. & Int'l L.
255-284.
43. Foreshoreand SeabedAct 2004, ss. 48 and 68 respectively.
44. Commencing with Hamlet ofBakerLake v. Ministerof IndianAffairs andNorthernDevelopment,
[1979] 1 F.C. 487 and developed in subsequent cases, particularly Delgamuukw v. The Queen (1997),
153 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (S.C.C.).
45. Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004, s.50. The test is thus more onerous than the Canadian
"reasonable degree of continuity."
46. Ibid. at ss. 52(2), (3).
47. See, for example, R v. Sparrow(1990), 70 D.L.R. (4th) 385 (S.C.C.); Delgamuukw v. The Queen
(1997), 153 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (S.C.C.).
48. As McHugh, supra note 8 noted, this regime assumes the existence of substantive native title
rights, although it is not clear the courts would generally recognize such rights.
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such a title the Court ofAppeal cautioned against optimism in any such claim
succeeding. Of course there could be no overarching claim to the coastline
in its entirety but only localized claims by individual groups contingent on
meeting strict factual and legal tests. The deputy prime minister, who was
also charged with the government's policy response to NgatiApa, himself
thought of Ngati Apa as raising only "the remote prospect that customary
rights might be crystallized as exclusive ownership." 49
In any event the test for showing this stronger form of native title is
extremely onerous, again largely following the Canadian jurisprudence in
requiring exclusive use and occupation "without substantial interruption"
since 1840 (when the founding Treaty of Waitangi was signed by the
Britiish Crown and Maori leaders) but with the additional requirement
of showing continuous title to contiguous land since 1840.50 This latter
requirement of continuous title in contiguous land, unrelated to existing
common law tests, was a new twist added to the final version of the bill.
As Maori and academic commentators have forcefully pointed out, it will
present enormous difficulties to claimants, as they will only rarely own
contiguous land. 1 It is effectively a statutory override of the Ngati Apa
decision, which held that the question as to whether foreshore and seabed
rights were extinguished by the sale of adjoining land was a matter of fact
to be determined, thereby overturning the Ninety-Mile Beach precedent.
The Act essentially adopts the legally incorrect precedent of Ninety-Mile
Beach. In referring to the government's original proposal to abrogate any
Maori property rights which might arise out of the Ngati Apa decision
one distinguished commentator stated that "[t]here would be a gross
breach of established constitutional convention if Parliament reversed the
judgements given in their favour."52 Finally, in making a determination
of exclusive use and occupation the Act stipulates that "no account may
be taken of any spiritual or cultural association with the area, unless that
association is manifested in a physical activity or use related to a natural
or physical resource."5 3

49. Rt. Hon. Michael Cullen, "Human Rights and the Foreshore and Seabed" (Speech to the Human
Rights Commission Speakers Forum, June 2004) online: Scoop Independent News <http://www.
scoop.co.nz/mason/stories/PA0406/S00026.htm>.
50. Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004, ss.32 (1) (2).
51. Te Ope Mana a Tai, Summary andAnalysis ofAmendedforeshore and Seabed Bill (17 November
2004) at 7 online: Te Ope Mana a Tai <http://www.teope.co.nz/pdflAnalysis%20o/ 2OAmended%20
%20Foreshore%20and%20Sea> ;Boast 2005, supra note 2 at 156.
52. Jock Broolfield, "Treaty does not stop at water's edge" The New Zealand Herald (1 July 2003)
(the author is a professor emeritus at Auckland University and former Dean of University of Auckland
Law School).
53. Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004, s.32(3).
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Thus, having acknowledged the possibility of a strong version of native
title amounting to exclusive use and occupation, the legislation excludes
the possibility of such a claim by asserting the Crown's unqualified "full
and beneficial ownership" unconstrained by even the kind of fiduciary duty
to Maori which had been hinted at in case law.54 Whilst allowing for the
possibility of less threatening "customary rights orders," the legislation
undertook a barely qualified destruction of "territorial customary rights,"
or those which amounted to an exclusive use and occupation, by asserting
55
the Crown's "absolute property" in the foreshore and seabed.
However, the effective extinguishment is slightly qualified in a
somewhat bizarre piece of drafting by which allowance is made for a
"group" (that is to say including non-Maori) to obtain a "finding" from
the High Court that the group "would, but for the vesting of the full
legal and beneficial ownership of the public foreshore and seabed in the
Crown ...
have held territorial customary rights to a particular area of the
public foreshore and seabed at common law" (emphasis added).56 That
is to say, a claimant group can attempt to surmount the difficult tests for
demonstrating this "territorial" customary right in order to show that it
would have succeeded in its claim if only the legislature had not already
extinguished the right!
What would be the point of such a potentially costly57 exercise? In
the event of successfully making such a claim the group can then apply
for either of two orders from the High Court.5" It may apply for an order
establishing a foreshore and seabed reserve, 59 the purpose of which would
be to recognize a guardianship and stewardship role for Maori claimants
but also to "enable that area to be held for the common use and benefit of
the people of New Zealand."6 The effect would therefore be to reduce
the territorial customary right to something akin to the less threatening
customary rights order and effectively extinguish any spectre of the
exclusive use and occupation which the claimant had demonstrated.
The second kind of order for which the successful claimant could
apply, and which the High Court must grant, is for a referral of the finding
to the attomey-general and the Minister of Maori Affairs. Upon such a
54. In New Zealand see, for example, New Zealand Maori Council v. Attorney-General, [1987] 1
N.Z.L.R. 641; in Canada see, for example, Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 29, R. v. Sparrow
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, Delgamuuktv v. The Queen (1998), 153 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (S.C.C.).
55. Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004, s.13(l).
56. Ibid., s.33.
57. Boast 2005, supra note 2 at 161 points to the possibility that such claims will require prohibitively
expensive historical evidence.
58. Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004, s. 36.
59. Ibid., s. 43
60. Ibid., s. 40.
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referral the ministers "must enter into discussionswith the applicant group
for the purpose of negotiating an agreement as to the nature and extent of
the redress to be given by the Crown" (emphasis added). 6' The wording
("the redress") suggests that some kind of redress would be forthcoming
notwithstanding the ambiguous requirement that the ministers merely
enter into "discussions." Note, however, that the use of the term "redress"
is significant. The Waitangi Tribunal had already pointed out that "redress"
was an inappropriate term in this context since it had been used by the
Tribunal in cases where Maori had grounds for a claim but one not
grounded in legal rights. 62 In respect of the foreshore and seabed there
were clearly legal rights at issue and the appropriate terminology would
therefore be of one of "compensation," for the breach of legal rights could
not be discharged by redress alone. In the words of the Tribunal "[r]edress
occupies a vaguer territory, where the language of right gives way to the
language of hope. ' 63 Thus there is not only a conspicuous lack of any
requirement that redress be "fair" or "satisfactory" to the claimants but
even that it be correctly characterized as "compensation" for legal rights
lost.64 Rather it would appear to remain at the grace and favour of the
Crown.
In summary the Foreshore andSeabed Act 2004 is a brutal legislative
response to a long overdue but politically unpopular judicial recognition of
a common law native title right in Maori. Richard Boast has described it as
"probably the biggest land expropriation since the New Zealand Settlements
Act 1863, or perhaps ever. '65 It is an extraordinary and unprecedented
usurpation of a line ofjurisprudence beginning in the nineteenth century in
the British colonies and reinvigorated by the Canadian (and laterAustralian)
courts over the past thirty years. 66 Just as the New Zealand courts appeared
to be making some effort to align themselves with that jurisprudence the
New Zealand Parliament has stepped backward to the nineteenth century
in emasculating an important source of indigenous peoples' rights. 67 It has
done so by re-characterizing common law conceptions of the content and
legal tests for native title; for example, by splitting the title into relatively
innocuous "customary rights" grounded in specific activities, and more
61. Ibid.,s.37(l).
62. See, for example, Waitangi Tribunal, supra note 35 at para. 5.1.7.
63. Waitangi Tribunal, supra note 35.
64. Regarding the principle that compulsory acquisition of land in which indigenous people have a
'native law' interest gives rise to a right to compensation see, for example, the Privy Council decision
in McGuire v. Hastings DistrictCouncil, [2002] 2 N.Z.L.R. 577 at 592, 594 (per Lord Cooke).
65. Boast 2005, supra note 2 at 132.
66. Boast 2005, supra, ch. 5; McHugh, supra note 8 at 145-153.
67. See, for example, Te Ope Mana a Tai, supra note 51 at 8: "[the Act] represents an unparalleled
attack on Maori ...
in a manner not seen since the mid-Nineteenth century."
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far-reaching property rights into a "territorial customary right" which must
be first be proved but which cannot be realized. Proof of the latter has been
made the subject of legal tests more onerous than the already difficult tests
stipulated by the common law in otherjurisdictions, and even if successfully
demonstrated the extinguished right is not subject to any guarantee of fair
compensation. In effect a property right has been extinguished, without
any assurance of adequate compensation, on grounds of race, since it is
a right that resides only in an indigenous people. Comparable existing
private titles are protected.
The prospect of such draconian and apparently discriminatory
legislation might be expected to draw criticism, though of course the courts
themselves cannot respond. The cacophony of protest from Maori (to the
government's policy response) and non-Maori (to the original Ngati Apa
decision) made rational and informed debate difficult, particularly given
the legal niceties involved in the Court of Appeal overturning its own
precedent. 68 A more measured response, at least from the Maori perspective,
came from the Waitangi Tribunal but a brief historical perspective might
first serve to inform the discussion.
II. Historicalperspectives
The Court of Appeal finding in Ngati Apa and the subsequent Foreshore
and Seabed Act 2004 can best be understood in the historical framework
of New Zealand case law and legislation on the contentious issue of
indigenous peoples' rights in British colonies. The original sources of
those rights in colonial legal systems are treaties and common law native
title, both of which are relevant in New Zealand as in Canada and the
United States, though not in Australia (where no treaties were signed). In
New Zealand the Treaty of Waitangi, ceding sovereignty to the Queen but
reserving native title in Maori, was signed by representatives of the British
Crown and Maori in 1840.69
The Treaty occupies a peculiar and highly ambiguous space in
New Zealand's constitutional arrangements. Notwithstanding that New
Zealand joins only the United Kingdom and Israel as having no written
constitution, the Treaty is said by some commentators to be of fundamental
constitutional significance. The Waitangi Tribunal has characterized it as

68. See, for example, Waitangi Tribunal, supra note 35 at 3: "the public discourse has generally been
... unsatisfying, oversimplifying the issues and thereby distorting them ... polarised positions (not
necessarily underpinned by good information) have quickly been adopted."
69. Note that there were English and Maori versions of the Treaty with important textual differences,
the analysis of which is beyond the scope of this paper. See, for example, Philip Joseph, Constitutional
and Administrative Law in New Zealand, 2nd ed, (Wellington: Brookers, 2001) at 47.
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"a basic constitutional document,"7 the Privy Council described it as being
"of the greatest constitutional importance to New Zealand,"'" Sir Robin
Cooke (as he then was, and speaking extra-judicially) called it "simply
the most important document in New Zealand's history"72 and it has been
described judicially as "part of the fabric of New Zealand society ... part of
the context in which legislation which impinges upon its principles is to be
interpreted when it is proper ... to have resort to extrinsic materials."73 Yet
as a matter of law the Treaty is effectively legally unenforceable7 4 unless
and until it is specifically invoked by the legislature. The provenance of
this unfortunate principle goes back to the nineteenth century case of
Wi Parata,which characterized the Treaty as a "simple nullity" on the
grounds of the incapacity of Maori as "primitive barbarians" to enter into
the treaty.75 It is not a constraint on the legislative supremacy of the New
Zealand Parliament.76 The modem authority on the legal status of the
Treaty holds that it has no legal force unless and until it is specifically
adopted by statute into domestic law.77 There has been no such general
incorporation.78 The contrast with the constitutionalizing of treaty rights in
the Canadian Constitution is marked.
In the 1980s a reformist Labour government began to include "treaty
clauses" in particular pieces of legislation, most famously in the State
Owned EnterprisesAct 1986. That Act was an important instrument in a
far-reaching program of neo-liberal economic reforms. It provided for the
divestment of certain government assets subject to the proviso (section 9)
that "[n]othing in this Act shall permit the Crown to act in a manner that
is inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi." The Court of
Appeal was therefore required to give some legal form to whatever these
"principles" might be when confronted with the issue in New Zealand

70. Waitangi Tribunal, Ngai Tahu Sea Fisheries Report online: Waitangi Tribunal <http://www.
waitangi-tribunal.govt.nz/scripts/reports/reports/27/F D 1A BCE-C32D-4096-83BB-7 11 7C 1BAB
CBF.pdf'> at para 11.3.
71. New ZealandMaori Council v. Attorney-General, [1994] 1 N.Z.L.R. 513 at 516.
72. Joe Williams, "Treaty Making in New Zealand" in Marcia Langton et al., eds., Honour Among
Nations? Treaties andAgreements with Indigenous People (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press,
2004) 163 at 164.
73. Huakina Development Trust v Waikato Valley Authority, [1987] 2 N.Z.L.R. 188 at 210 per
Chilwell J.
74. Ibid.
75. Wi Parata,supra note II at 77.
76. New ZealandMaori Council, supranote 54.
77. Hoani Te Heuheu v. Aotea District Maori Land Board [1941] A.C. 308 (P.C.), affirmed in New
ZealandMaori Council v. A-G [1987] 1 N.Z.L.R. 641 at 642 (H.C. & C.A.).
78. For a more detailed, if inconclusive, discussion of current constitutional thinking and the Treaty
of Waitangi see, for example, B.V.Harris "The Treaty of Waitangi and the Constitutional Future of
New Zealand" (2005) 2 N.Z.L. Rev. 189.
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Maori Council v. Attorney-General.79 The Court elected to eschew
a "strict or literal interpretation" of the words of the treaty 0 in favour
of safer motherhood notions of "partnership" including a duty on the
partners to act with "utmost good faith" and a recognition of the "honour
of the Crown" being at stake-principles which one might have thought
could be taken as a given. Though hailed as a landmark in New Zealand
jurisprudence-which it arguably was in light of the historic repression of
Maori treaty and common law rights-one need only consider the negation
of those terms to appreciate their banality; that is to say, rivalry as opposed
to partnership, bad faith as opposed to "utmost good faith," shame of the
Crown as opposed to "honour."
The Treaty then has at least arguably become "a bona fide legal and
policy risk to be managed within the entire machinery of the bureaucracy,
... 'vertically integrated' into the systems of government."'" Yet it remains
legally fragile and subject to the whim of Parliament, that is to say the
whims of passing legislative majorities, both in terms of its inclusion in
legislation (it is noticeably absent, for example, from the Foreshoreand
Seabed Act notwithstanding its subject matter) and even of removing
mention in existing legislation.82 It lacks any formal constitutional
protection and might effectively be removed from New Zealand's legal
and constitutional landscape with the stroke of a legislature's pen. Its
vulnerability is perhaps demonstrated no more dramatically than in the
Foreshoreand Seabed Act itself. Comparisons with treaty case law, and
in particular with long-established principles of treaty interpretation from
Canada and the United States sympathetic to indigenous peoples, are
invidious but beyond the scope of this paper."
If the Treaty of Waitangi has been largely disavowed as the source
of legal rights for Maori then a second basis of claims, particularly in
the context of post-Calder Canada and post-Mabo Australia, would be
79. New Zealand Maori Council, supra note 54.
80. Nev Zealand Maori Council, supra note 54 at 673 (per Richardson J.) and 714 (per Bisson J.).
81. Williams, supra note 72 at 167-8. For more detailed recitation of how Maori legal interests are
protected see B.V.Harris, supra note 78 at 191-192.
82. Rt. Hon. Winston Peters, Media Release, "MPs urged to support Treaty Principles Bill" (10 May
2005) online: New Zealand First <http://www.nzfirst.org.nz>. The Bill in question is The Principles of

the Treaty of Waitangi Deletion Bill, a private member's bill which seeks to remove references to the
principles of the Treaty from all legislation. The author is the leader of the New Zealand First political

party, a former Treasurer and Deputy Prime Minister and now a Minister in the current government.
See also Winston Peters "A treaty for us all" The Press (Christchurch) (12 May 2005), A9 wherein the

author claims that the Treaty principles "have turned the treaty into a festering sore ...
"
83. For American treaty cases see, for example, Worcester v. Georgia 6 Pet 515 (1832), Fellows
v.Blacksmith 60 U.S. 366 (1856), Jones v. Meehan 175 U.S. 1 (1899), Carpenter v. Shaw 280 U.S.
363 (1930), Fleming v. McCurtain 214 U.S. 56 (1909), Tulee v. Washington 315 U.S. 681 (1942); for
Canadian cases see, for example, R. v.Norwegiiick, [1983] I S.C.R. 29, R. v. Simon, [1985] 2 S.C.R.
387, R. v. Sioui, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025.
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common law native title. Indeed the Ngati Apa decision was an attempt
to more closely align the New Zealand jurisprudence with those modem
contexts. A brief history will inform that claim.
The common law native title was effectively confirmed in the Treaty
itself,84 but also confirmed as an independent source of rights in early New
Zealand jurisprudence.85 In 1877 the Wi Paratacase, as well as declaring
the Treaty of Waitangi to be a nullity, set down a new authority for the rule
that native title was not a legal obligation on the Crown but only a moral
one and required statutory enactment to ground a claim. That precedent
endured (in, for example, the Ninety-Mile Beach case which was overruled
in Ngati Apa), notwithstanding criticism from the Privy Council early in
the twentieth century.86 The New Zealand response to the Privy Council's
rebuke was to enact legislation making native title unenforceable against
the Crown. The Native Lands Act 1909 contained a provision87 which
effectively codified the Wi Paratadecision in providing that customary
title was not enforceable against the Crown. The Maori Affairs Act 1953
preserved this provision 88 and it was only repealed by the Maori LandAct
1993.
The judicial and legislative prohibition on the assertion of common law
native title claims has been peculiar to New Zealand and understandably

84. Article I of the Treaty of Waitangi states (in the English version) that Maori are to retain '...
the full exclusive and undisturbed possession of the Lands and Estates Forests Fisheries and other
properties which they may collectively or individually possess so long as it is their wish and desire
For an early affirmation see, for example, R. v. Symonds (1847) N.Z.P.C.C. 387 at 390
85. Ibid. per Chapman J: "it cannot be too solemnly asserted that [Native title] is entitled to be
respected, that it cannot be extinguished (at least in times of peace) otherwise than by the free consent
of the Native occupiers ... the Treaty of Waitangi ... does not assert either in doctrine or in practice any
thing new and unsettled."
86. See Nireaha Tamaki v. Baker (1901) N.Z.P.C.C. 371 where the Privy Council was pressed with
the argument "that there is no customary law of the Maoris of which the Courts of law can take
cognizance" only to riposte "it is rather late in the day for such an argument to be addressed to a New
Zealand Court. It does not seem possible to get rid of the express words of ss.3 and 4 of the Native
Rights Act 1865 [referring to native title derived from 'custom and usage'] by saying (as the Chief
Justice said [in Wi Parata])that 'a phrase in a statute 'cannot call what is non-existent into being." See
also Wallis v. Solicitor-General (1903) N.Z.P.C.C. 730.
87. s. 84.
88. s. 155. Note that a special limitation was imposed via the Limitation Act 1950 requiring that any
claims against the Crown must be brought within 12 years of the breach, thus blocking most potential
claims.
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has provoked criticism.8 9 The legislative response to Ngati Apa, reviving
the possibility of an unextinguished native title, might therefore be seen as
a return to the nineteenth century. Attempts by the courts, initially the Privy
Council and now the New Zealand Court of Appeal, to advocate or defend
conceptions of a common law native title have been met with a quick
and crude legislative rebuttal. Again, comparisons with modem Canadian
jurisprudence and the constitutionalizing of common law aboriginal rights
are invidious.
Thus from the Wi Paratacase in 1877 until the present Maori have
been unable as of right to assert claims under the Treaty (unless specifically
empowered by the Parliament)9" or under common law native title. 9' That
vacuum has been at least partially filled by a peculiarly New Zealand legal
response in the form of the Maori Land Court. This court was originally
constituted in 1862 and reconstituted in 1993.92 It was established as a
legal gateway through which Maori could establish their interests in land
and for resolving disputes in respect of such lands. It mostly deals with
issues relating to the administration of Maori freehold land, and where the
status of the land is unclear it can make a determination. 93 The purpose
of the original (then) Native Land Court in the nineteenth century was to
facilitate the conversion of Maori customary titles into a freehold interest
which could be disposed of to settlers. The conversion of customary titles
into Crown-granted freeholds has long been regarded as completed but the
Ngati Apa case now raised the possibility of new determinations of title to
the foreshore and seabed.
Article II of the Treaty of Waitangi also included "exclusive rights
of pre-emption" in the Crown, as is the case with modem common law
native title. The intention is usually taken to be protection of indigenous
peoples from the aggressive pursuit of land purchases by settlers, though
See, for example, a comment by F. Brookfield:
the courts cannot be exonerated in their refusal to recognize at common law ...Maori
customary rights in respect of land and fisheries ... [there is] no doubt that since the late
1870 s successive New Zealand judges have misunderstood the law ... on the whole they
did indeed get it wrong ... [and] notwithstanding correction by the Privy Council around
the turn of the century ... this view has prevailed into our own time ... now little customary
land remains (emphasis added).
"The New Zealand Constitution" in Ian Kawharu, ed., Waitangi: Maori and Pakeha Perspectives of
the Treaty of Waitangi (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1989) 1 at 10.
90. Hoani Te Heuheu, supra note 77.
91. Brookfield, supra note 89.
92. Te Ture WhenuaMaoriAct 1993 (MaoriLandAct 1993) (N.Z.) 1993/4. Fora historyoftheCourt
see David Williams Te Kooti tango whenua ": The Native Land Court 1864-1909 (Wellington: Huia,
1999).
93. There may be uncertainty as to whether the land is, for example, Maori customary land, Maori
freehold land, Crown land or general land held in freehold title. Should it be Maori customary land
then the court can determine which Maori group has best title based on history and custom.
89.
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in New Zealand the right of pre-emption was periodically manipulated
to suit settler interests.94 Within twenty years of the signing of the Treaty
nearly all of the South Island and much of the North Island was purchased
from Maori at negligible prices.95 In 1852 New Zealand was granted selfgovernment and settlers began to assume responsibility for Maori affairs,
including facilitating the further acquisition of Maori land and the use of
the Native Land Court to validate titles. Conflicts over land culminated
in the Maori Land Wars and subsequent confiscation of land from hostile
Maori.96 It was in this context that the unfortunate Wi Paratadecision was
handed down in 1877.
A modem institutional response to the resolution of Maori claims has
been the negotiation of agreements by the Office of Treaty Settlements on
such issues as fishing rights, 97 an attempt to impose a "fiscal envelope" on
the total amount the government considered affordable in settling claims98
and various individual tribal claims. 99 These last claims broadly follow the
precedent of Canadian settlements such as the Nisga'a Agreement.100 The
modem negotiated settlements might be read as an institutional response
to the negation of Treaty and native title rights, though in that light they
are inconsistent with the government response to NgatiApa; that is to say,
there was in the Foreshoreand SeabedAct 2004 and its lead-up a distinct
unwillingness on the part of the government either to enter into meaningful
consultation with Maori or to commit to compensation.
Finally, a quasi-judicial institutional response to unresolved Treaty
issues came with the creation of the Waitangi Tribunal in 1975"1 as a forum

94. See, for example, M.P.K. Sorenson, "The Settlement of New Zealand from 1835" in Paul
Havemann, ed., IndigenousPeoples 'Rights in Australia,Canada & New Zealand (Auckland: Oxford
University Press, 1999) 162 at 165.
95. Ibid.
96. Ibid. at 169 re the New ZealandSettlement Act 1863 - more than three million acres of Maori
land were confiscated.
97. Treaty of Waitangi (FisheriesClaims) Settlement Act 1992 (N.Z.) 1992/121 (the 'Sealord' deal).
The agreement included a cash settlement and share of future quotas in exchange for extinguishing any
commercial fisheries claims.
98. In 1994, the government proposed a $1 billion settlement fund based not on actual losses suffered
by Maori but on what the government thought it could afford. The cap was removed in 2000 and the
criteria for settlement were now to be merit.
99. For a brief summary of the settlement process and the settlements reached with Tainui, Ngati
Awa and Ngai Tahu see, for example, Morag McDowell & Duncan Webb, The New Zealand Legal
System: Structures, processes and legal theory, 31 ed. (Wellington: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2002)
231-5.
100. Government of British Columbia, Ministry of Aboriginal Relations and Reconciliation, Nisga 'a
Final Agreement (2000) online: Government of British Columbia <http://www.gov.bc.ca/arr//
negotiation/nisgaa/default.htm>.
101. Treaty of Waitangi Act, 1975, section 4. Its original prospective jurisdiction was enlarged to
cover claims dating back to the 1840 signing of the Treaty of Waitangi by the Treaty of Waitangi
Amendment Act, 1985.
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for dealing with Maori grievances.' °2 It will be recalled that with almost no
common law jurisprudence on which to draw with respect to native title,
and no general (legal) recognition of the Treaty of Waitangi, Maori were
faced with a dearth of institutional forums within which to assert claims.
The establishment of the Tribunal was a political response to that vacuum
at a time of growing Maori nationalism. The Maori Land Court was, as
we have seen, essentially a judicial vehicle for translating Maori claims to
land into a recognizable legal form for ease of settler acquisition.
The Waitangi Tribunal on the other hand is not a court but a quasijudicial body,'03 and its jurisdiction is restricted to advisory opinions,
including the issue of advisory opinions on matters pertaining to the
Treaty of Waitangi and thus (for the purposes of this piece) including the
government's policy response to Ngati Apa.
The Waitangi Tribunal overcame its early years of relative impotence
10 4
to become both an instrumental and a legitimating voice for Maori claims
and a respected voice in New Zealand social and political life, even "a kind
of truth commission."'0 5 Among its responsibilities is a duty to report on
proposed legislation referred to it by Parliament. In the case of the original
Foreshoreand Seabed Bill, it conducted an urgent enquiry at the behest of
various Maori groups. It did so with some trepidation-indeed even before
the Tribunal hearings began the government warned that "in the end this
matter will be resolved in the legislative arena so any solution must be able
to attract a Parliamentary majority,"' 6 clearing signalling the majoritarian
imperatives driving policy. Nonetheless the Tribunal's report on the
government's proposed legislative response to NgatiApa might reasonably
be taken to be a litmus test on the integrity of that response with respect to
Treaty issues. It will be recalled that the foreshore legislation extinguished
common law native title rights where they amounted to exclusive use and
occupation but that such rights were affirmed in the Treaty of Waitangi. As
we have seen the Treaty does not confer legal status on the rights but the

102. For a brief overview of the Tribunal see, for example, McDowell & Webb, supra note 99 at 22327.
103. In reporting on the Crown's foreshore and seabed policy the Tribunal self-characterized as "a
quasi-judicial body standing outside the political process ... proceed[ing] in the expectation that
governments in New Zealand want to be good governments, whose actions although carried by power
are mitigated by fairness" (Waitangi Tribunal, supra note 35 at xii).
104. McDowell & Webb, supra note 99 at 226.
105. Benedict Kingsbury "Liberal Democracy and Tribal People: Group Rights in Aotearoa /New
Zealand" (2002) 52 U.T.L.J. 101 at 120.
106. Hon. Dr. Michael Cullen, News Release, "Govt aiming for foreshore policy statement by Xmas"
(23 October 2003) online: New Zealand Government <http://www.beehive.govt.nz/viewDocument.
cfm?DocumentlD=181 80>.
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abrogation of native title rights must have important implications for the
Treaty itself, hence the importance of the Waitangi Tribunal's comments.
III. The Waitangi TribunalReport
Unsurprisingly the Tribunal issued a powerful rebuke to the government. 0 7
With regard to the government's consultation process with Maori the
Tribunal opined that "the ...
process was too short; and it was fairly clear
that the Government had already made up its mind."'0 8 With respect to the
government's initial policy response announcing its intention to extinguish
Maori property rights where exclusive use and occupation were shown, the
Tribunal saw the consequent inability of Maori to assert their rights in the
courts as effectively removing the rights themselves. It similarly condemned
the removal of property rights without compensation, substituting rather a
mere right to an opportunity to participate in an administrative process'0 9
(referring to what became in the final legislation a right to enter into
"discussions"). Generally the Tribunal saw the Crown as benefiting from a
greater degree of certainty as to the status of the foreshore and seabed and
instead transferring "a situation of extreme uncertainty"" 0 to Maori. The
Tribunal characterized the policy as a clear breach of the principles of the
Treaty of Waitangi and of failing to respect "wider norms of domestic and
international law that underpin good government ...
includ[ing] the rule of
law, and the principles of fairness and non-discrimination."'1
Specific breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi were of course of particular
concern to the Tribunal. It found the Crown's policy to be in breach of the
Article II protection of native title," 2 and that the Crown did so in breach
of the test of "exceptional circumstances and as a last resort in the national
interest."" 3 It also found a breach of Article III of the Treaty, which
guaranteed to Maori the rights of all citizens to equal treatment under the
law. It did so by extinguishing only the property rights of Maori and in
denying Maori the protection of the rule of law by effectively overturning
a judicial decision and denying further access to the courts (since the

107. Waitangi Tribunal, supranote 35.
108. Waitangi Tribunal, supranote 35 at xii.
109. Waitangi Tribunal, supranote 35 at xiii.
110. Waitangi Tribunal, supranote 35.
111.Waitangi Tribunal, supranote 35 at xiv. For academic support on the same issues see, for example,
Brookfield, supra note 25 at 318: referring to the recognition and protection of Maori customary law
property rights in the context of accusations of'judicial activism' by the Court of Appeal in NgatiApa
he notes that:
[s]ince the values of equality before the law and of non-discrimination endure in present
day New Zealand society, the Ngati Apa Court legitimately, without exceeding its proper
constitutional rule, repaired a serious defect in the New Zealand common law.
112. Supra note 84.
113. Waitangi Tribunal, supra note 35 at 127-8.
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Act, it will be recalled, substitutes for territorial customary rights a mere
right to participate in an administrative procedure via "discussions").
Further, the policy was said to breach the fundamental principles of the
Treaty as articulated by the courts, including principles of "reciprocity,"
"partnership," "active protection," "equity" and "redress." ' 14 It saw the
"overriding of the rule of law ...
[as] a very unusual and significant step
in 2004"" and recommended instead that the government draw back and
"do nothing"; that is to say, allow the courts to investigate and declare
rights on a case by case basis as foreshadowed in Ngati Apa and if
necessary respond when the ambit of those rights is known.1 6 That would
be to follow the path of other comparable jurisdictions such as Canada,
albeit without the constitutionalizing of aboriginal rights."' It would also
of course facilitate Maori access to the courts to assert the legal rights the
courts had recognized in Ngati Apa, an access one might have assumed as
residing in all citizens.
The government's response to the Waitangi Tribunal Report was
predictably negative," 8 with ministers again invoking parliamentary
sovereignty as a determinative answer to any challenge.' 19The government
proceeded with legislation that was in important ways even more draconian
than originally foreshadowed in the initial policy response considered by
the Tribunal, in effect reinforcing its rejection of the Tribunal's report.
There was, however, one final legal stage upon which the issues might
be addressed, for the government was required under domestic legislation
to at least make a show of rationalizing what was to informed observers
an expropriation of a property right on racial grounds with no guarantee of
just compensation. There was opportunity for some robust rights discourse
given that the assertion of "one law for all New Zealanders," namely access
to the foreshore and seabed, was in effect a denial of the legal rights of
Maori to assert a title which the courts had said might be theirs.
IV. Conflict with the Bill of Rights Act 1990
The institutional opportunity for addressing rights conflicts flows from the
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (Bill of Rights). 20 Proposals in 1985
114. Waitangi Tribunal, supra note 35 at 130-6.
115. Waitangi Tribunal, supra note 35 at 138.
116. Waitangi Tribunal, supra note 35 at 143.
117. ConstitutionAct 1982, being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.11, s. 35.
118. Hon. Dr. Michael Cullen, News Release (8 March 2004), "WaitangiTribunal Report disappointing"
online: <http://www.beehive.govt.nz/Print/PrintDocument.aspx?DocumentlD=19091> opining that
"some of the central conclusions of the report ... depend upon dubious or incorrect assumptions by the
Tribunal."
is an
119. Ibid. (asserting that the most important of these "dubious or incorrect assumptions ...
implicit rejection of the principle of parliamentary sovereignty").
of Rights see Joseph, supra note 69 at ch.26.
120. For more detailed discussion of the Bill

62

The Dalhousie Law Journal

for a constitutionally entrenched Bill based on the Canadian Charterof
Rights and Freedoms, including entrenchment of the Treaty of Waitangi,
foundered on predictable concerns over parliamentary supremacy and fear
of incorporating the Treaty. 121 The Bill that was eventually salvaged was
passed as ordinary, indeed subordinate, legislation in that it specifically
preserved inconsistent legislation.122 It promotes the adoption of
interpretative principles with respect to other legislation that is consistent
with the Bill2 3 but also imposes a "reasonable limits" constraint-the
"justified limitations" clause (section 5) allows for "reasonable limits
prescribed by law [such] as can be demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society," though it too is explicitly subject to the section 4
subordinating clause. 124 Aside from the subordinating effect of section
4, the section 5 "reasonable limits" clause is taken directly from the
CanadianCharter.2 5 Importantly for the present analysis, the New Zealand
legislation offers no constitutional protection to those claiming even the
most egregious breaches of its enumerated rights since it will always be
overridden (via section 4) by the clear and plain intention of conflicting
legislation, in this case the Foreshoreand Seabed Act. 2 6 In short, the New
Zealand Bill ofRights offers perhaps the weakest form of rights protection
that one could imagine in rights legislation.2 7

121. Joseph, supra note 69 at 1019-20.
122. New ZealandBill ofRights Act 1990 (N.Z.), 1999/109, s. 4 states that:
No court shall, in relation to any enactment (whether passed or made before or after the
commencement of this Bill of Rights),
(a) Hold any provision of the enactment to be impliedly repealed or revoked, or to be
in any way invalid or ineffective; or
(b) Decline to apply any provision of the enactment
by reason only that the provision is inconsistent with any provision of this Bill of Rights.
(cf. Canadian Bill of Rights 1960, s.2.)
123. Ibid., s. 6 reads:
Wherever an enactment can be given a meaning that is consistent with the rights and
freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights, that meaning shall be preferred to any other
meaning.

124. Ibid., s. 5 reads:
Subject to section 4 of this Bill of Rights, the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill
of Rights may be subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society (emphasis added).
125. Canadian Charterof Rights andFreedoms, Part I of the ConstitutionAct 1982, being Schedule
B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.l, s. 1.
126. For a "Canadian" critique of the Bill of Rights see, for example, H.Schwartz, "The short happy
life and tragic death of the New Zealand Bill of Rights" (1998) N.Z. L. Rev. 259; G.W.G. Leane,
"Enacting Bills of Rights: Canada and the Curious Case of New Zealand's 'Thin' Democracy" (2004)
26 Hum. R.Q. 152.
127. Leane, ibid., for example, (at 188) in regard to "the protection of the legal rights of indigenous
populations, the dangers of majoritarianism are most clearly evident and most troubling in the New
Zealand case." More generally, see Geoffrey Palmer Unbridled Power: An Interpretation of New
Zealands Constitutionand Government, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).
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Section 19 of the Bill of Rights also incorporates the right to freedom
from discrimination under the New Zealand Human Rights Act 1993,
which in turn enumerates various prohibited grounds of discrimination
including that of "race."' 28 In respect of the Foreshore and Seabed Act
only Maori are losing the right to realize territorial customary rights,
whereas existing private owners are unaffected, so there would seem to be
clear discrimination on grounds of race. In addition the Human Rights Act
1993 forbids indirect discrimination,2 9 that is to say where the effect of the
practice (if not its explicit wording) constitutes discrimination.
So even though the ForeshoreandSeabedActvery clearly extinguishes
territorial customary title on grounds prohibited by the Bill of Rights it
will trump the Bill of Rights through the subordinating effect of section 4.
There is no doubt that the foreshore legislation will prevail. That disposes
of substantive legal arguments about legislative conflicts.
However, there was a remaining procedural constraint on the
government by virtue of section 7 of the Bill of Rights, requiring the
attorney-general to bring to the attention of Parliament any inconsistency
between a proposed bill and the Bill ofRights. 3 0This section echoes section
3 of the CanadianBill of Rights 1960, a non-entrenched predecessor to the
CanadianCharterofRights and Freedoms, and has similarly been applied
only sparsely.' 3' Under section 7 the New Zealand Parliament is at least to
be made conscious of its intention to derogate from the enumerated rights
and thereby at least risk the spectre of some political accountability.'32
Although the statutory obligation under section 7 of the New Zealand
Bill of Rights arises upon the introduction of a government bill, it is
theoretically possible for an offending section to be inserted later-for
example, this happened on one occasion in respect of a retrospective
criminal penalty. 133 Generally the section has not proven to have its
anticipated deterrent effect; for example, over the first ten years four of
128. Human Rights Act 1993 (N.Z.) 1993/82, s. 21(f).
129. Ibid. at s. 65.
130. Supra note 122, s. 7 reads:
Where any Bill is introduced into the House of Representatives, the Attorney-General
shall,
(a) In the case of a Government Bill, on the introduction of that Bill; or
(b) In any other case, as soon as practicable after the introduction of the Bill,
bring to the attention of the House of Representatives any provision in the Bill that appears
to be inconsistent with any of the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights.
131. Joseph, supra note 69 at 1049. The Minister of Justice reported only once to the Canadian
Parliament under section 3. For a detailed analysis of pre-FSA scrutiny see Janet L Hiebert "Rights
Vetting in NZ and Canada: Similar Idea, Different Outcomes" (2005) 3 N.Z.J. Pub. & Int'l L. 63104.
132. Joseph, supra note 69 at 1048.
133. Joseph, supra note 69 at 105 1.
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five government bills proceeded through Parliament notwithstanding
infringements of the Bill of Rights. 3 4 Even should the attorney-general
admit to a conflict between the Bill ofRights and proposed legislation it will
not affect the passage of the proposed legislation (because of section 4-see
discussion above) but merely ensure a certain measure of self-awareness
in the Parliament. Nonetheless there is at least some potential for political
embarrassment, though in the case of the Foreshore and Seabed Act the
main Opposition (National) Party would have gone even further'35 and
would not likely have protested any breach of the Bill of Rights. In any
event, and notwithstanding the flaws in the section 7 procedure, there was
not to be even this minimal degree of examination by Parliament since
the attorney-general, a member of the cabinet which framed the Act itself,
would not concede the existence of a breach.
Perhaps nowhere is the weakness of the New Zealand rights regime
more clearly evident than in this refusal to even acknowledge a breach
of the Bill of Rights-and this is about as egregious a breach as one could
reasonably imagine in a modem liberal democracy-far less have to justify
it or even defend it. Canadian observers would do well to ponder the
virtues of their (comparatively) robust rights regime, whilst Canadian First
Nations might murmur some thanks to Pierre Trudeau and the constitutional
entrenchment of their aboriginal and treaty rights.'36 Academic observers
looking for a sophisticated rationale for this race-based curtailment of
rights will be disappointed, for while such arguments would be difficult to
make the attorney-general declined even to make the effort. The analysis,
including a travesty of the Oakes test arguments familiar to Canadian
Charterobservers, is at best superficial and at worst self-serving.
V. The attorney-general' opinion
Even a casual glance at section 5 of the Bill of Rights (wherein "the rights
and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights may be subject only to such
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified
in a free and democratic society") suggests that the language and logic
are manipulable. It is perhaps conceivable that the attorney-general, a
member of the same cabinet that framed the legislation in question, might
be tempted to spin such an investigation accordingly, especially with the

134. Joseph, supra note 69 at 1053-54. For a more detailed account of the impact of the Bill of Rights
at 1054-61.
135. See, for example, Dr. Don Brash (National Party Leader) "Speech to the House in the third
reading debate on the Foreshore and Seabed Bill" (18 November 2004) online: National <http://www.
national.org.nz/Article.aspx?ArticlelD=3181>.
136. For further discussion and for a comparative analysis of the Canadian and New Zealand
experience with constitutional reform see, for example, Leane, supra note 126.
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knowledge that a refusal or failure to discharge her obligations under
section 7 is not reviewable by the courts.'3 7 Indeed, and notwithstanding
what would appear to be a very substantial inconsistency between the Bill
ofRights provisions on discrimination and the Foreshoreand SeabedAct 's
discriminatory provisions on territorial customary rights, the attorneygeneral's opinion on the Foreshore and Seabed Bill considered the Bill to
138
be consistent with the Bill ofRights.
The methodology for deciding whether a Bill ofRights section 7 report
is necessary in respect of the Foreshoreand Seabed Act first requires an
analysis of whether under section 5 of the Bill of Rights a primafacie
infringement is a reasonable limit "as can be demonstrably justified in
a free and democratic society." 13 9 Recall that section 5 mirrors section I
of the Canadian Charterof Rights and Freedoms except of course that
a failure of New Zealand legislation to satisfy the relevant test will not
invalidate the legislation due to the operation of the section 4 override in
the Bill of Rights. Nonetheless some minimal level of accountability is
called for under section 7.
The attorney-general's analysis is revealing and utterly at odds with
that of the Waitangi Tribunal. In summary, she accepts that "there is a
significant argument for a primafacie breach of section 19" (the freedom
from discrimination clause of the Bill of Rights) 140 but concludes that any
such infringement is "demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic
society" under section 5 of the Bill ofRights. 141The logic of that conclusion,
or rather the lack of it, is illuminating.
The attorney-general first deals with the question of whether the
legislation deprives Maori of the fruits of litigation under s.27(3) of the
Bill ofRights. 142 The proper interpretation of the section is disputed but the
attorney-general simply chooses the Crown's own position that it means
only that the Crown has no proceduraladvantage but that it is free to assert

137. Joseph, supra note 69 at 1053.
138. "Attorney-General's opinion on consistency of legislation with the Bill of Rights: Foreshore and
Seabed Bill" (6 May 2004) online: Ministry of Justice <http://www.justice.govt.nz/bill-of-rights/billlist-2004/f-bill/foreshore-seabed-bill.html> at para. l.
139. Joseph, supra note 69 at 1051-52. The full text of section 5 stipulates that "[s]ubject to section
4 of this Bill of Rights, the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights may be subject only
to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic
society."
140. Attorney-General, supra note 128 at para.2. 1.
141. Attorney-General, supra note 128 at para.2.2.
142. Section 27(3) states that "[e]very person has the right to bring civil proceedings against, and to
defend civil proceeding brought by, the Crown, and to have those proceedings heard, according to law,
in the same way as civil proceedings between individuals."
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a substantive advantage by reversing the effect of a judgment.'1 Similarly
she defends claims of a breach of private property rights under section 21
(citing Canadian and New Zealand authorities) 44 and of a right to natural
justice under section 27.141
Section 20 of the Bill of Rights protects the right of "an ethnic ...
minority ...
to enjoy the culture, [and] to profess and practice the religion
The attorney-general admits that section 20 may be
that
minority."
...
of
relevant where the rights in question are necessary in conducting activities
essential to the culture of the group. As to the question of whether the
exclusive title (being the foundation of the extinguished territorial
customary title) is necessary for the practice of essential cultural activities
the attorney-general simply asserts that "[m]y understanding is exclusive
title is not necessary for the enjoyment of any of the practices raised by
Maori before the Waitangi Tribunal or in representations to government"
(original emphasis).'46 That is a rather odd (if not disingenuous) claim
given that the right to make such claims had only just been acknowledged
in Ngati Apa and that there had as yet been no opportunity to assert any
factual claims in the courts. That there was no history of such claims is
again hardly surprising given that they had been statutorily barred and
had in any event been judicially disavowed in Ninety-Mile Beach. 47 The
attorney-general simply asserts that which she is required to show.
But rights issues become most hotly debated on the issue of
discrimination, particularly on grounds of race. Recall that freedom from
discrimination on grounds of race, whether direct or indirect (where
the effect is discriminatory) is one of the protected rights in the Bill of
Rights. The requirement of proof of comparative disadvantage (from the
Canadian case of Andrews)' is met in the case of the Foreshore and
Seabed Act and the Attorney-General has little choice but to admit that
there is "a significant argument that the Bill, to the extent that it treats the
holders of 'specified freehold interests' and Maori customary landowners
differently (the latter's rights are extinguished, while the former's rights
It
are preserved), may contain a primafacie breach of section 19 ....
will also be recalled that under section 7 aprimafacieinfringement brings
143. Attorney-General, supra note 138 at para. 12-18. (Contrary opinions are cited in para.14 and at
Brookfield, supra note 89.)
144. Attorney-General, supra note 138 at para. 19-22.
145. Attorney-General, supra note 138 at para. 23.
146. Attorney-General, supra note 138 at para. 31 & 36.
147. On this see Paul McHugh "Aboriginal Title in New Zealand: A Retrospect and Prospect" (2004)
2 N.Z.J. Pub. & Int'l L. 139.
148. Attorney-General, supra note 138 at para. 42 & 44, citing Andrews v. Law Society of British
Columbia (1989), 56 D.L.R. (4th) 1, McIntyre J. (S.C.C.).
149. Attorney-General, supra note 138 at para. 56, 75-76 & 79.
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section 5 into play, requiring the attorney-general to subject the impugned
legislation to the "reasonable limits" test in establishing whether or not
she need bring the infringement to the attention of Parliament. Again,
whatever the outcome of the section 5 analysis, section 4 of the Bill of
Rights will preserve the conflicting legislation, but the conflict should
at least be acknowledged under section 7. The section 5 analysis might
therefore reasonably be taken to represent a litmus test of how seriously
the government of the day takes rights discourse, or more to the point,
how seriously it regards the rights claims of its aboriginal people. So the
intention here is to show that analysis as paradigmatic both of the historical
treatment of indigenous people's rights in New Zealand and of the flawed
rights regime which still facilitates that treatment today.
The judicial approach in New Zealand to a section 5 justified limitation
draws heavily on Canadian jurisprudence with respect to section 1 of the
Charterof Rights and Freedoms and the leading Canadian authority of R.
v. Oakes. 5o In New Zealand the test of a "compelling legislative objective"
is of course less demanding as the rights are not constitutionally entrenched
as in Canada but rather are enumerated in ordinary, if not subordinate,
legislation. That might reasonably be taken to suggest that less importance
is placed on the enumerated rights in New Zealand as opposed to Canada.
In this Australia might be characterized as occupying a middle ground at
least in respect of racial discrimination. 5'
That fragility of rights protections also suggests a different kind
of liberal rights discourse informing the respective instruments, the
Canadian model being more distinctively Kantian in affording individual
rights supreme protection in the constitution and the New Zealand model
being more distinctively utilitarian in subordinating them to the whims
of majoritarian legislatures.'52 Indeed that philosophical inclination is
reflected in the opening paragraph of the attorney-general's section 5
analysis wherein she adopts the approach of Richardson J. (writing extrajudicially) in looking to "a utilitarian assessment of the public welfare
in determining whether setting reasonable limits on a protected right is
justified."' 53 Of course that may well be putting too theoretical and too
150. R v. Oakes (1986), 26 D.L.R. (4th) 200 (S.C.C.). For a more detailed analysis see, for example,
Joseph, supra note 69 at 1039-1043.
151. Whilst Australia lacks a constitutionally entrenched Bill of Rights, the Australian Racial
Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), enacted pursuant to the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, was sufficient authority to read down attempts at a legislative
override of aboriginal title by the Queensland Government (Mabo v. Queensland (1988), 166 C.L.R.
186 (H.C.A.) [Mabo (No.1)].
152. For an analysis of the respective rights regimes of New Zealand and Australia see, for example,
Leane, supra note 126.
153. Attorney-General, supra note 138 at para.80.
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kind a face on what was more likely a crudely executed piece of polldriven political expediency. However, it does echo the egalitarian rhetoric
under which politicians and commentators sought to justify overturning
Ngati Apa.
But even taking the attorney-general at face value when she then
turns to the reasons for the government policy response, one is struck by
the superficial and self-serving tone of the argument. She tells us that the
"principal reason for introducing the Bill is to clarify the law [given that]
[t]he state of the law on this subject may best be described as radically
154
indeterminate."'
That is largely true, for the Ngati Apa decision whilst legally
conventional was a significant departure from the status quo. But as we
have seen the reasons for that indeterminacy are that on the one hand
Maori were historically precluded by legislation from bringing native title
claims,' 55 and on the other hand the legally incorrect Ninety-Mile Beach
decision (overturned by Ngati Apa) foreclosed claims to the foreshore
and seabed. There have simply been no legal or institutional means for
Maori to have their common law native title rights "clarified," and yet this
disenfranchisement is now turned back on them by the attorney-general
to justify extinguishing the flicker of resuscitated rights offered in Ngati
Apa. It surely lies ill in the mouth of the perpetrator of those historical
wrongs to invoke them as a defence. Lest the point be overlooked, the
attorney-general then proceeds in the next paragraph to blame Maori for
this dearth of native title jurisprudence: "[t]he common law of customary
interests has been little developed to date in New Zealand because Maori
have chosen to obtain redress through the Treaty of Waitangi" (emphasis
added). 5 6 "Without legislation" (she goes on to say) "the Courts would be
required to develop the common law of indigenous rights on a case-by-case
basis over many years."' 57 Indeed, just as they have in Canada, the United
States and more recently Australia! The regrettable jurisprudential lacuna
is as we have seen a consequence of the historical refusal of New Zealand
legislatures and courts to honour and develop a regime of aboriginal
and treaty rights. It surely ill behoves that same legislature to invoke the
failure as an excuse for further repression. The astonishing hypocrisy of
both blaming the victim for not seeking judicial recognition of native title
while removing access to the courts once redress is sought is apparent to
the observer, if not to the attorney-general.

154.
155.
156.
157.

Attorney-General, supra note 138 at para. 83.
Supra notes 86-88.
Attorney-General, supra note 138 at para. 84.
Attorney-General, supra note 138.
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Similar indications
of the Attomey-General's
self-serving
characterization of history can be seen in the next paragraph wherein she
invokes one of the witnesses before the Waitangi Tribunal as asserting
that "it was doubtful the common law would have recognised exclusive
rights equivalent to fee simple titles."' 58 Of course that was not for her to
say, but in any event the deputy prime minister had, barely two months
earlier, reiterated the spectre of "the granting of freehold title to what
could be substantialareas of foreshore and seabed" (emphasis added).159
Other attempts by the attorney-general to justify the legislation are simply
spurious-confusion over thejurisdiction of the Maori Land Court 160 (which
could be easily amended by legislation), confusion over the interface with
the Resource Management Act161 (which uncertainty should hardly be
resolved by the extinguishment of an inconvenient native title), and finally
a strange plea that "New Zealand is an island nation"' 62 and presumably
therefore entitled to suppress Maori (but not existing private) ownership
of any part of its coastline, though one would have thought that (on the
same reasoning) the same coastline would have been at least as important
to indigenous peoples.
In any event the attorney-general had still to confront the awkward
issue of the lack of guaranteed redress-not to say fair and adequate
compensation-for Maori for the extinguishment of any proven claim to
what the legislation calls "territorial customary rights." Recall that the
legislation allowed for Maori to claim territorial customary rights, that
is to say those amounting to exclusive use and occupation, in the High
Court, and if successful to apply for a referral to the attorney-general and
Minister for Maori Affairs. The ministers must then "enter into discussions
...
to consider the nature and extent of any redress that the Crown may
give" (emphasis added). 63 A right to enter into "discussions" with the very
party which extinguished the underlying right and with no guarantee of
any redress at all would hardly seem adequate compensation for the loss
of what was in effect a fee simple property right. Recall too that "redress"
is in any event inappropriate terminology when it is a legal right that has
been abrogated. The attorney-general does in fact concede that "[t]here is

158. Attorney-General, supra note 138 at para. 85. (the witness was in fact Paul McHugh whose
writings have been most influential in this area).
159. Cullen, supra note 118.
160. Attorney- General, supra note 138 at para. 86.
161. Attorney-General, supra note 138 at para 87.
162. Attorney-General, supra note 138 at para 88.
163. New Zealand Bill 129-1, Foreshore and Seabed Bill, 1VSess., 47th Parl., 2004, cl.33.
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an argument that a body independent of government should determine the
nature and extent of the redress. '""MIndeed!
Yet in another paternalistic dismissal of the issue the attorneygeneral simply asserts that "the process for redress through negotiation
[I]t cannot be assumed the Crown
with the government is justified ....

will approach negotiations in bad faith.' 65 It is not surprising that the
attorney-general herself was conscious of potential accusations of bad
faith. Recall that the legislation in question extinguishes the most valuable
aspect of a property right which Maori had just had affirmed after a
century of legislative override and judicial dismissal (which the Court of
Appeal itself confessed was legally wrong), and in its place been granted
access to an administrative process with no guarantee of fair or adequate
compensation, such compensation being dependent on the poll-driven
policies of governing parties which must inevitably pander to a hostile
non-Maori majority. Further, the legislation has been enacted in the face of
fierce resistance from Maori, inadequate consultation, in flagrant disregard
of the Waitangi Tribunal and, as can be seen from the attorney-general's
report, an unwillingness to seriously address rights issues. It is difficult
to imagine a context more suggestive of bad faith. Maori have literally
nowhere else to go, the courts and the legislature having been effectively
closed to them. Their last hope-proving a territorial customary right in the
High Court-lies in bringing an expensive and difficult claim to the courts
in the hope of being granted a hearing from an almost certainly hostile
government, whose only assurance is that (after all this) "you can trust
us"!
Readers familiar with "justified limitation" jurisprudence will note
that there is no consideration of other aspects of the Oakes test which, it
will be recalled, has been adopted by the New Zealand courts. 166 As noted
the requirement of a "pressing and substantial objective" is a less onerous
test in New Zealand given the subordinate status of the Bill of Rights as
opposed to the constitutional status of the Canadian Charter.But there is
no attempt to address the test of proportionality between the means used
(extinguishment of a property right) and the ends served (stated as being
the removal of uncertainty with respect to the nature and extent of native
title, though the attorney-general herself asserts that they may not even
exist as fee simple rights). 167 Perhaps the answer to that reluctance lies in
164. Attorney-Generalsupranote 138 at para. 97.
165. Attorney-General, supra note 138 at para. 98.
166. Joseph, supra note 69 at 1039-40, citing Ministry of Transport v. Noort, [1992] 3 N.Z.L.R. 260
at 283 (C.A.).
167. Attorney-General, supra note 138 at para 85.
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one aspect of the test-that "the measures should impair as little as possible
the right or freedom in question.' 68 If ever a legislative hammer was
taken to crack an annoying nut this must surely be it. She also, perhaps
for the obvious reason, chooses not to reference the rich vein of Canadian
jurisprudence on native title though well aware of it.'69
Finally, the Attorney-General's opinion ends with an admission that,
while there is no domestic remedy left to Maori, "I accept there is a risk
a human rights body may regard this [lack of guaranteed redress] aspect
of the Bill as imposing an unjustifiable limitation on a protected right,"' 7 °
which indeed proved to be the case. "However," she continues, "I note the
government must be accorded a margin of appreciation in this area,"'' and
therefore "the Bill meets the section 5 test ... [and] accordingly, it does not
1' 7 2
involve any breach of the Bill of Rights Act.'
In short the attorney-general invokes a presumption of honourable
Crown behaviour which is highly questionable in light of the Act itself and
its history. Having effectively admitted that the legislation is discriminatory
she simply claims a "margin of appreciation" for the government and
simply dismisses the discrimination, again assuming away that which is
required to be shown. This signals a cavalier disregard not only for the
rights of indigenous peoples but, more broadly, for her statutory role as
protector of civil liberties generally in the face of parliamentary supremacy.
However, it is (as the earlier discussion suggests) entirely consistent with
the provenance of indigenous rights and of rights discourse generally in
New Zealand.' 73
VI. Human rights organizations

New Zealand is a party to the International Convention on the Elimination
ofAll Forms of Racial Discrimination,which it ratified in 1972. The UN

Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) includes
74
in its mandate the rights of indigenous peoples.1 In particular, 171
The Committee especially calls upon States parties to recognize and
protect the rights of indigenous peoples to own, develop, control and
168. R. v. Oakes, supra note 150 at 373-4.
169. For example, in earlier references (at para. 58.2) to Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1997), 153
D.L.R. (4th) 193 (S.C.C.).
170. Attorney-General, supra note 138 at para. 102.
171. Attorney-General, supra note 138.
172. Attorney-General, supra note 138 at 103.
173. See Leane, supra note 126 for a more detailed discussion.
174. United Nations, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, "General
Indigenous Peoples" (A/52/18, annex V) para.l,
online:
Recommendation No.23:
Rights
Website
<http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/
United
Nations
Human
73984290dfea022b802565160056felc?Opendocument>.
175. Ibid. at para. 5.
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use their communal lands, territories and resources and, where they
have been deprived of their lands and territories traditionallyowned
or otherwise inhabitedor used without theirfree and informed consent,
to take steps to return those lands and territories.Only when this is for
factual reasons not possible, the right to restitutionshould be substituted
by the right to just,fair andprompt compensation. Such compensation
should asfar as possible take theform oflands andterritories(emphasis
added).

Three Maori groups went to CERD under its "early warning measures and
urgent action procedures." CERD released its decision in March 2005.176
It expressed concern at the "apparent haste" with which the Foreshore
and Seabed Act 2004 was enacted, that "insufficient consideration may
have been given to alternative responses to the Ngati Apa decision," and
that "the legislation appears to the Committee, on balance, to contain
discriminatory aspects against the Maori."' 77 All eighteen members of the
Committee agreed that the Act discriminates.' 78 The decision was unusual
in finding New Zealand to be in breach of a human rights treaty, and was
the first time it had been criticized by an international human rights body
in respect of its indigenous peoples.'7 9 It was also the first time that a
New Zealand government chose to respond negatively to an international
tribunal.
The New Zealand prime minister reacted with hostility to the report,
saying that CERD followed "a most unsatisfactory process" and opted
instead to shoot the messenger by characterizing CERD as "a committee
that sits on the outer edge of the UN system."'' 80 The deputy prime minister
was similarly unresponsive in saying that there were no plans to change
the Act, whilst also denying that the Act did in fact breach the Convention
("a very bizarre conclusion" according to the complainant's lawyer). 8 '
As well as incurring the ongoing scrutiny of CERD, New Zealand will,
as a consequence of the finding of race discrimination concerns with the
Act, come under ongoing scrutiny from the UN Human Rights Committee
(pursuant to the same human rights Convention as was cited in the long

176. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, "New Zealand Foreshore and Seabed
Act 2004" (Decision 1 (66), online: United Nations <http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/docs/
CERD.C.66.NZL.Dec. 1.pdf>.
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178. Andrew Erueti and Claire Charters, "The Government's Response to CERD," online: Kennett
Bros <http://www.kennett.co.nz/law/indigenous/foreshore.htm>.
179. Clare Charters and Andrew Erueti, "Report From the Inside: The CERD Committee's Review of
the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004" (2005) 36 V.U.W.L.R. 257 at 257-8.
180. "Prime Minister critical of UN committee's process" The New Zealand Herald (14 March
2005).
181. Jonanna Norris "UN criticises foreshore law" The Press (Christchurch) (14 March 2005).
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title to its own Bill of Rights) 8 ' and the Committee on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights (established under the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights). However, in the absence of
effective compliance and enforcement powers international fora such as
these are limited to "name and shame" exercises which, as is often the
case, are ineffective in constraining the New Zealand government. 83
An alternative domestic forum is available to Maori under the New
Zealand Human Rights AmendmentAct 2001. If a complainant can establish
discrimination under the Human Rights Act 1993 there is a process by
which the New Zealand Human Rights Commission can provide mediation
services which, if unsuccessful, can lead to civil proceedings before the
Human Rights Review Tribunal. The Human Rights Commission was
originally established under the Human Rights Commission Act 1977 to
enable New Zealand to ratify the InternationalCovenant on Civil and
PoliticalRights and the InternationalCovenanton Economic, Culturaland
Social Rights.'84 The Tribunal can grant various forms of relief, including
a declaration of inconsistency with respect to the impugned legislation
and the Bill of Rights. Recall that the Act prohibits discrimination on the
grounds of race.' 85 In response to such a declaration the relevant minister
must table a response in Parliament within 120 days. However, that will
not repudiate the legislation (since section 4 of the Bill ofRights preserves
inconsistent legislation). The motivation is rather one of accountability.
Of course even to reach this stage assumes that the government has not
been successful in its section 5 "justified limitations" defence to a prima
facie inconsistency, which in the case of the Foreshoreand Seabed Act it
claims to have done.
The Human Rights Commission itself did make a submission on the
original Foreshore and Seabed Bill, identifying potential breaches of the
rights of minorities, the right to freedom from discrimination, the right

182. The Long Title of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 includes an affirmation of "New
Zealand's commitment to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights." Note that there
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qualified), the New Zealand Court of Appeal and a broad cross-section of Maori - see Charters and
Erueti, supra note 178 at 270-27 1.
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not to be arbitrarily deprived of property and compensation, and the right
to development.' 8 6 The Commission recommended that the legislation be
abandoned and that the court process continue; failing that, at least that
compensation be guaranteed, an appeal process be implemented and time
limits for bringing claims be removed.'87 Their advice went unheeded on
each point.
These international and domestic rights tribunals do not pose any
material threat to determined government action, merely the threat of
some measure of political accountability and embarrassment. That will not
be a problem for governments buoyed by popular support for the policy
in question, as is the case here with overwhelming non-Maori support
for foreclosing Maori claims to customary rights. That is of course the
very reason why certain rights need constitutional protection from selfinterested majorities.
Conclusion
There is little need of theory here. Unusually (for a rights dispute) there
is no need for a subtle, finely calibrated balancing of competing rights
for this is more a narrative about the assertion of raw political power
unconstrained by such arguments. The merely descriptive is sufficient to
make some obvious points about this particular rights regime.
It is interesting that in this extinguishment of indigenous peoples'
rights the language invoked to justify it is consistently framed in terms
of parliamentary sovereignty, which is taken to be the sine qua non of
the argument. There is simply no consciousness that any rights have (or
should have) sufficient status to stand against the monolithic force of a
parliamentary majority, legitimized (as it is presumed to be) by a democratic
mandate. In this case therefore Maori have no effective recourse left open
to them, effectively no place to go; not to the courts, as the High Court
no longer has the ability to grant territorial customary rights, and will not
review the section 7 opinion by the attorney-general; not to the non-Maoridominated legislature, for it is the instrument of extinguishment; not to the
Waitangi Tribunal, for it can only deliver an advisory opinion, did so in
the strongest terms and was ignored; not to the international community,
for its criticism has no domestic force and has been rejected; and not to the
domestic Human Rights Commission, for it can only deliver a declaration
of no binding force. Thus, in the absence of the kinds of constitutional and/
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or institutional checks and balances found in other liberal democracies,
there is in New Zealand no effective domestic remedy in the face of
legislative discrimination 89 or indeed of other breaches of civil and
political rights commonly taken for granted in liberal democracies. The
only legal course now open to Maori is to hope to surmount the formidable
legal and financial impediments to demonstrating territorial customary
rights in the High Court in order to access an administrative process which
may or may not result in fair compensation from governments dependent
for support on a non-Maori majority demonstrably hostile to the assertion
of such rights. A bleak prospect. What kinds of alternate readings might
one give to this troubling scenario?
As a legal academic-admittedly one raised (in terms of legal
education) on the native law jurisprudence of post-Calder and postCharter Canada-writing in the context of rights discourse in a modern
liberal democracy it is a very clear picture. To put it bluntly, the rights
of an indigenous minority have been crudely steamrollered by a selfinterested settler majority represented by a poll-driven governing party
unconstrained by the checks and balances of comparable Anglo-American
structures of government. 910 It is difficult to characterize as anything more
than unprincipled political opportunism. To justify discrimination on the
grounds of crude egalitarianism without acknowledging that it is bought
at the price of corresponding minority rights is hypocrisy of a particularly
offensive kind. The asymmetry with Canada-where one finds an articulate
and sophisticated native title jurisprudence evolving through powerful and
empowered courts backed by a commitment to individual and minority
rights in a written constitution-is especially dramatic.
As a politician the events must appear quite differently. A senior appellate
court suddenly re-discovers a native title it had somehow overlooked
for one hundred and fifty years and defends it against prior legislation
which was grounded in turn on the assumption that the native title was no
impediment as the courts themselves had said so. As a practical matter,
the politicians might say, it was simply too late in the day for the Court
of Appeal to suddenly discover its inner rights-bearer. As well, practically
speaking, the realpolitik of a non-indigenous majority overwhelmingly
hostile to what it sees as "special rights" for its indigenous peoples could
readily be invoked to justify the smokescreen of "equal rights for all New
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Zealanders," misleading as that egalitarian mantra is. Political realities
dictated the response, and indeed the Labour government which enacted
the Foreshore and Seabed Act managed to survive only narrowly in a
subsequent election in September 2005, albeit with a sharp rebuke from
Maori voters who elected four members to a newly formed Maori Party.
The deputy prime minister, who was also responsible for managing the
foreshore controversy, admitted that the government's response to Ngati
Apa was necessary because of "the depth of Pakeha [non-Maori] anger and
alarm."' 191New Zealand may be a liberal democracy but it is a utilitarian one
and the Kantian liberalism of Canadian or American rights discourse does
not necessarily sit well. 92 That discomfort is paradigmatically illustrated
in New Zealand's Bill of Rights Act, itself an ode to legislative supremacy
and reflecting a utilitarianism that in this case permits legislation that even
the attorney-general had to concede smacked of racial discrimination.
It is, however, rather difficult to accept the attorney-general's "justified
limitation" arguments at face value; if there were defensible arguments
under the Canadian-style section 5 analysis she did not articulate them, but
presumably did not feel an overwhelming need to do so.
A related argument for political theorists would be that of parliamentary
versus constitutional supremacy. A recurring theme in the foreshore
debate, most clearly articulated by the deputy prime minister, was that no
matter what the courts or the Waitangi Tribunal might say, the ultimate
responsibility (and power) lay with the Parliament.'93 In New Zealand,
with a Westminster system of government but lacking an upper house or
a written constitution, that really meant the cabinet of the ruling party. On
a continuum of legislative versus constitutional supremacy New Zealand
must lie at the opposite extreme from, say, Canada or the United States.' 94
As in no other liberal democracy, the Parliament in New Zealand is
supreme. So in the end these events are perhaps best read as a cautionary
tale of the risks faced by minorities-even in a liberal democracy-when
the baser majoritarian instincts of a legislature and its constituent public
are not constrained either by adequate institutional checks and balances or
ultimately by a constitution which holds it to certain rights promises. 95
A disinterested pragmatist might argue that the impugned rights may
never have amounted to anything substantial, and that it would take a
191. The Press(Christchurch) (13 October 2005) A2.
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great deal of time, resources and considerable social discord to tease out
their meaning and content, if any. The response to that of course must be
that it cannot lie with the self-interested, settler majority to foreclose that
option; at a minimum it suggests a "long conversation" of consultation and
negotiation, if not litigation. Rights struggles are notoriously difficult and
contentious but surely no less important for that.
A member of an indigenous minority would likely see here a familiar
story of inchoate rights being snatched away whenever majority settler
interests are threatened. Rarely have New Zealand courts been willing
to find and give content to native title (or indeed treaty) rights as have
Canadian and (later) Australian courts. When they have done so settlerdominated legislatures have typically responded with legislation to remove
any judicially-inspired threat, as happened at the turn of the century 9 6 and
now a century later with respect to the NgatiApa case. Faced with generally
unsympathetic courts and a hostile legislature, and lacking the protection
of a constitutionally entrenched regime of rights, there are no effective
domestic options left to Maori. In that light the Foreshore and Seabed
Act presents as just another manifestation of a sustained and determined
policy of disempowering an indigenous people. As the Waitangi Tribunal
put it (in less colloquial terms), the monkey of native title uncertainty was
deftly removed from settlers' backs and placed firmly on Maori. That is
a course that Canada, and even Australia (though with less enthusiasm),
have declined to follow.
In the more cosmopolitan context of the international human rights
regime there is some solace to be found by Maori but that regime typically
lacks the institutional apparatus to make it effective. The ability to "name
and shame" has little domestic impact on governments wielding almost
unconstrained power and relying on non-indigenous majorities for their
electoral prospects. There may be a certain embarrassment in international
fora but nothing that would weigh heavily on local politicians or indeed on
197
the New Zealand public.
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In conclusion it is submitted that this story of dispossession can be
taken as an exemplary narrative of the importance of not only minority
indigenous peoples'rights but of the importance of constitutional protection
of certain rights against self-interested majorities. One of those rights must
be freedom from discrimination on grounds of race. The full extent of
whatever native title rights might have flowed from the NgatiApa decision
will likely never be known and that loss must diminish' non-Maori New
Zealanders for it was their own law which was supposed to honour them.
It simply did not honour them enough. There was a casual arrogance in
the government's response which diminishes it more than it does Maori.
It is against such arrogance that constitutional entrenchment offers some
(though never complete) protection.
When expressing disappointment with one's political masters there is
a commonly invoked aphorism along the lines of "they are us, but we are
more than them."' 98 In light of the public hostility to minority Maori rights
that would not seem to be the case here. The worst one might say of the
politicians here is that they failed to make us better than we are, indeed
they did not even try.
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Boutwood Lectures, Corpus Christi College, Cambridge University) online: Harvard Law <http://
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